Computational Social Choice 2020

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Plan for Today

In *judgment aggregation* (JA) agents are asked to judge whether each of a given number of propositions is true or false, and we then need to aggregate this information into a single collective judgment.

Today's lecture will be an introduction to JA:

- motivating example: *doctrinal paradox*
- *formal model* for JA and relationship to *preference aggregation*
- some *specific aggregation rules* to use in practice
- two examples for results using the *axiomatic method*

Most of this material is covered in my book chapter cited below.

U. Endriss. Judgment Aggregation. In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A.D. Procaccia (eds.), *Handbook of Computational Social Choice*. CUP, 2016.

Example: The Doctrinal Paradox

A court with three judges is considering a case in contract law.

Legal doctrine stipulates that the defendant is *liable* (r) iff the contract was *valid* (p) and has been *breached* (q): $r \leftrightarrow p \wedge q$.

	p	q	r
Judge 1	Yes	Yes	Yes
Judge 2	No	Yes	No
Judge 3	Yes	No	No

Exercise: *Should this court pronounce the defendant guilty or not?*

L.A. Kornhauser and L.G. Sager. The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts. *California Law Review*, 1993.

Why Paradox?

So why is this example usually referred to as a "paradox"?

	p	q	$p \wedge q$
Agent 1	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agent 2	No	Yes	No
Agent 3	Yes	No	No
Majority	Yes	Yes	No

Explanation 1: Two natural aggregation rules, the *premise-based rule* and the *conclusion-based rule*, produce *different* outcomes.

Explanation 2: Each individual judgment is *logically consistent*, but the collective judgment returned by the (natural) *majority rule* is *not*.

In philosophy, this is also known as the *discursive dilemma* of choosing between *responsiveness* to the views of decision makers (by respecting majority decisions) and the *consistency* of collective decisions.

The Model

Notation: Let $\sim\varphi := \varphi'$ if $\varphi = \neg\varphi'$ and let $\sim\varphi := \neg\varphi$ otherwise.

An *agenda* Φ is a finite nonempty set of propositional formulas (w/o double negation) closed under complementation: $\varphi \in \Phi \;\Rightarrow\; \sim\varphi \in \Phi$.

A *judgment set* J on an agenda Φ is a subset of Φ. We call J:

- *complete* if $\varphi \in J$ or $\sim\varphi \in J$ for all $\varphi \in \Phi$
- *complement-free* if $\varphi \not\in J$ or $\sim\varphi \not\in J$ for all $\varphi \in \Phi$
- *consistent* if there exists an assignment satisfying all $\varphi \in J$

Let $\mathcal{J}(\Phi)$ be the set of all complete and consistent subsets of Φ.

Now a finite set of *agents* $N = \{1, \ldots, n\}$, with $n \geqslant 2$, express judgments on the formulas in Φ, producing a *profile* $\boldsymbol{J} = (J_1, \ldots, J_n)$.

A (resolute) *aggregation rule* for an agenda Φ and a set of n agents is a function mapping a profile of complete and consistent individual judgment sets to a single collective judgment set: $F : \mathcal{J}(\Phi)^n \to 2^\Phi$.

Example: Majority Rule

Suppose three agents ($N = \{1, 2, 3\}$) express judgments on the propositions in the agenda $\Phi = \{p, \neg p, q, \neg q, p \vee q, \neg(p \vee q)\}$.

For simplicity, we only show the positive formulas in our tables:

	p	q	$p \vee q$	formal notation
Agent 1	Yes	No	Yes	$J_1 = \{p, \neg q, p \vee q\}$
Agent 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	$J_2 = \{p, q, p \vee q\}$
Agent 3	No	No	No	$J_3 = \{\neg p, \neg q, \neg(p \vee q)\}$

Under the (strict) *majority rule* we accept a formula if more than half of the agents do: $F_{\mathrm{maj}}(\boldsymbol{J}) = \{p, \neg q, p \vee q\}$ [complete and consistent!]

Recall: F_{maj} does *not* guarantee *consistent* outcomes in general.

Exercise: *Show that F_{maj} guarantees complement-free outcomes.*

Exercise: *Show that F_{maj} guarantees complete outcomes iff n is odd.*

Embedding Preference Aggregation

In *preference aggregation*, agents express preferences (linear orders) over a set of alternatives A. We want a *SWF* $F : \mathcal{L}(A)^n \to \mathcal{L}(A)$.

Introduce a propositional variable $p_{x \succ y}$ for every $x, y \in A$ with $x \neq y$. Build $\Phi = \{p_{x \succ y}, \neg p_{x \succ y} \mid x \neq y\} \cup \{\Gamma, \neg\Gamma\}$, where Γ is conjunction of:

- Antisymmetry: $p_{x \succ y} \leftrightarrow \neg p_{y \succ x}$ for all distinct $x, y \in A$
- Transitivity: $p_{x \succ y} \wedge p_{y \succ z} \to p_{x \succ z}$ for all distinct $x, y, z \in A$

Now the *Condorcet Paradox* can be modelled in JA:

	Γ	$p_{a \succ b}$	$p_{b \succ c}$	$p_{a \succ c}$	*corresponding order*
Agent 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	$a \succ b \succ c$
Agent 2	Yes	No	Yes	No	$b \succ c \succ a$
Agent 3	Yes	Yes	No	No	$c \succ a \succ b$
Majority	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	*not a linear order*

Quota Rules

Let $N_\varphi^{\boldsymbol{J}}$ denote the *coalition* of *supporters* of φ in $\boldsymbol{J}$, i.e., the set of all those agents who accept formula φ in profile $\boldsymbol{J} = (J_1, \ldots, J_n)$:

$$N_\varphi^{\boldsymbol{J}} \quad := \quad \{i \in N \mid \varphi \in J_i\}$$

The (uniform) *quota rule* F_q with quota $q \in \{0, 1, \ldots, n{+}1\}$ accepts all propositions accepted by at least q of the indiviual agents:

$$F_q(\boldsymbol{J}) \quad = \quad \{\varphi \in \Phi \mid \#N_\varphi^{\boldsymbol{J}} \geqslant q\}$$

Example: The *(strict) majority rule* is the quota rule with $q = \lceil \frac{n+1}{2} \rceil$.

Intuition: high quotas good for consistency (but bad for completeness)

Exercise: *Show that F_q with $q = n$ guarantees consistent outcomes!*

Recall: The doctrinal paradox agenda is $\{p, \neg p, q, \neg q, p \wedge q, \neg(p \wedge q)\}$.

Exercise: *For the doctrinal paradox agenda and n agents, what is the lowest uniform quota q that will guarantee consistent outcomes?*

Premise-Based Aggregation

Suppose we can divide the agenda into *premises* and *conclusions:*

$$\Phi \quad = \quad \Phi_p \uplus \Phi_c \quad \text{(each closed under complementation)}$$

Then the *premise-based rule* F_{pre} for Φ_p and Φ_c is this function:

$$F_{\text{pre}}(\boldsymbol{J}) \quad = \quad \Delta \cup \{\varphi \in \Phi_c \mid \Delta \models \varphi\},$$
$$\text{where } \Delta = \{\varphi \in \Phi_p \mid \#N_\varphi^{\boldsymbol{J}} > \frac{n}{2}\}$$

A common assumption is that *premises* = *literals*.

Exercise: *Show that this assumption guarantees consistent outcomes.*

Exercise: *Does it also guarantee completeness? What detail matters?*

Remark: The *conclusion-based rule* is less attractive from a theoretical standpoint (as it is incomplete by design), but often used in practice.

Example: Premise-Based Aggregation

Suppose *premises* = *literals*. Consider this example:

	p	q	r	$p \vee q \vee r$
Agent 1	Yes	No	No	Yes
Agent 2	No	Yes	No	Yes
Agent 3	No	No	Yes	Yes
F_{pre}	No	No	No	No

So the *unanimously accepted* conclusion is *collectively rejected!*

Discussion: *Is this ok?*

The Kemeny Rule

Recall: The *Kemeny rule* in preference aggregation (as a *SWF*) returns linear orders that minimise the cumulative distance to the profile.

We can generalise this idea to JA:

$$F_{\mathrm{Kem}}(\boldsymbol{J}) \quad = \quad \operatorname*{argmin}_{J \in \mathcal{J}(\Phi)} \sum_{i \in N} H(J, J_i), \quad \text{where } H(J, J_i) = |J \setminus J_i|$$

Here the *Hamming distance* $H(J, J_i)$ counts the number of positive formulas in the agenda on which J and J_i disagree.

This is an attractive rule, but outcome determination is *intractable*.

Exercise: *How would you generalise the Slater rule to JA?*

Basic Axioms for Judgment Aggregation

What makes for a "good" aggregation rule F? The following *axioms* all express intuitively appealing (but always debatable!) properties:

- *Anonymity:* Treat all agents symmetrically!

  For any profile $\boldsymbol{J}$ and any permutation $\pi : N \to N$, we should have $F(J_1, \ldots, J_n) = F(J_{\pi(1)}, \ldots, J_{\pi(n)})$.

- *Neutrality:* Treat all propositions symmetrically!

  For any φ, ψ in the agenda Φ and any profile $\boldsymbol{J}$ with $N_\varphi^{\boldsymbol{J}} = N_\psi^{\boldsymbol{J}}$ we should have $\varphi \in F(\boldsymbol{J}) \Leftrightarrow \psi \in F(\boldsymbol{J})$.

- *Independence:* Only the "pattern of acceptance" should matter!

  For any φ in the agenda Φ and any profiles $\boldsymbol{J}$ and $\boldsymbol{J}'$ with $N_\varphi^{\boldsymbol{J}} = N_\varphi^{\boldsymbol{J}'}$ we should have $\varphi \in F(\boldsymbol{J}) \Leftrightarrow \varphi \in F(\boldsymbol{J}')$.

Observe that the *majority rule* satisfies all of these axioms.

Exercise: *But so do some other rules! Can you think of examples?*

A Basic Impossibility Theorem

We saw that the majority rule cannot guarantee consistent outcomes. Is there some other "reasonable" aggregation rule that does not have this problem? *Surprisingly, no!* (at least not for certain agendas)

This is the main result in the original paper introducing the formal model of JA and proposing to apply the axiomatic method:

Theorem 1 (List and Pettit, 2002) *No judgment aggregation rule for an agenda Φ with $\{p, q, p \wedge q\} \subseteq \Phi$ that is anonymous, neutral, and independent can guarantee outcomes that are complete and consistent.*

Note that the theorem requires $n \geqslant 2$. (*Why?*)

C. List and P. Pettit. Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. *Economics and Philosophy*, 2002.

Proof: Part 1

Recall: $N_\varphi^{\boldsymbol{J}}$ is the set of agents who accept formula φ in profile $\boldsymbol{J}$.

Let F be any aggregator that is independent, anonymous, and neutral.

We observe:

- Due to *independence*, whether $\varphi \in F(\boldsymbol{J})$ only depends on $N_\varphi^{\boldsymbol{J}}$.
- Then, due to *anonymity*, whether $\varphi \in F(\boldsymbol{J})$ only depends on $|N_\varphi^{\boldsymbol{J}}|$.
- Finally, due to *neutrality*, the manner in which the status of $\varphi \in F(\boldsymbol{J})$ depends on $|N_\varphi^{\boldsymbol{J}}|$ must itself *not* depend on φ.

Thus: If φ and ψ are accepted by the same number of agents, then we must either accept both of them or reject both of them.

Proof: Part 2

Recall: For all $\varphi, \psi \in \Phi$, if $|N_\varphi^{\boldsymbol{J}}| = |N_\psi^{\boldsymbol{J}}|$, then $\varphi \in F(\boldsymbol{J}) \Leftrightarrow \psi \in F(\boldsymbol{J})$.

First, suppose the number n of agents is *odd* (and $n > 1$):

Consider a profile $\boldsymbol{J}$ where $\frac{n-1}{2}$ agents accept p and q; one accepts p but not q; one accepts q but not p; and $\frac{n-3}{2}$ accept neither p nor q. That is: $|N_p^{\boldsymbol{J}}| = |N_q^{\boldsymbol{J}}| = |N_{\neg(p \wedge q)}^{\boldsymbol{J}}|$. Then:

- Accepting all three formulas contradicts consistency. ✓
- But if we accept none, completeness forces us to accept their complements, which also contradicts consistency. ✓

If n is *even*, we can get our impossibility even without having to make (almost) any assumptions regarding the structure of the agenda:

Consider a profile $\boldsymbol{J}$ with $|N_p^{\boldsymbol{J}}| = |N_{\neg p}^{\boldsymbol{J}}|$. Then:

- Accepting both contradicts consistency. ✓
- Accepting neither contradicts completeness. ✓

Note: Neutrality only has "bite" here because we also have $q \in \Phi$.

Consistent Aggregation under the Majority Rule

An agenda Φ is said to have the *median property* (MP) iff every *minimally inconsistent subset* (mi-subset) of Φ has size $\leqslant 2$.

Intuition: MP means that all possible inconsistencies are "simple".

Theorem 2 (Nehring and Puppe, 2007) *The (strict) majority rule guarantees consistent outcomes for agenda Φ iff it has the MP (if $n \geqslant 3$).*

Remark: Note how $\{p, \neg p, q, \neg q, p \wedge q, \neg(p \wedge q)\}$ violates the MP.

Exercise: *Is this a positive or a negative result?*

Checking whether Φ has the MP is *intractable* (Endriss et al., 2012).

K. Nehring and C. Puppe. The Structure of Strategy-proof Social Choice. Part I: General Characterization and Possibility Results on Median Space. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 2007.

U. Endriss, U. Grandi, and D. Porello. Complexity of Judgment Aggregation. *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR)*, 2012.

Proof

<u>Claim:</u> Φ is *safe* [$F_{\text{maj}}(\boldsymbol{J})$ is consistent] $\Leftrightarrow$ Φ has the *MP* [mi-sets $\leqslant 2$]

($\Leftarrow$) Let Φ be an agenda with the MP. Now assume that there exists an admissible profile $\boldsymbol{J} \in \mathcal{J}(\Phi)^n$ such that $F_{\text{maj}}(\boldsymbol{J})$ is *not* consistent.

$\leadsto$ By MP, there exists an inconsistent set $\{\varphi, \psi\} \subseteq F_{\text{maj}}(\boldsymbol{J})$.
$\leadsto$ Each of φ and ψ must have been accepted by a strict majority.
$\leadsto$ One agent must have accepted both φ and ψ.
$\leadsto$ Contradiction (individual judgment sets must be consistent). ✓

($\Rightarrow$) Let Φ be an agenda that violates the MP, i.e., there exists a minimally inconsistent set $\Delta = \{\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_k\} \subseteq \Phi$ with $k > 2$.

Consider the profile $\boldsymbol{J}$, in which agent i accepts all formulas in Δ except for $\varphi_{1+(i \bmod 3)}$. Note that $\boldsymbol{J}$ is consistent. But the majority rule will accept all formulas in Δ, i.e., $F_{\text{maj}}(\boldsymbol{J})$ is inconsistent. ✓

Summary

This has been an introduction to the field of *judgment aggregation*, which (as we saw) is a *generalisation* of preference aggregation.

- examples for *rules:* quota rules, premise-based rule, Kemeny rule
- examples for *axioms:* anonymity, neutrality, independence
- examples for results: *impossibility* and *agenda characterisation*

JA is a powerful framework for modelling collective decision making that generalises several other models studied in COMSOC.

Topics not discussed: strategic behaviour, other logics, complexity, . . .

What next? Fair division, and specifically the cake cutting problem.