

## Homework #2

**Deadline: Wednesday, 5 October 2011, 11:00**

### Question 1 (10 marks)

This question concerns two alternative definitions of the property of *strong monotonicity* of a *resolute* voting rule  $F: \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{X})^{\mathcal{N}} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ . Recall the definition given in class:

- (a)  $F$  is called strongly monotonic if  $x^* = F(\mathbf{R})$  implies  $x^* = F(\mathbf{R}')$  for any alternative  $x^*$  and any two profiles  $\mathbf{R}$  and  $\mathbf{R}'$  with  $N_{x^* \succ y}^{\mathbf{R}} \subseteq N_{x^* \succ y}^{\mathbf{R}'}$  for all alternatives  $y \in \mathcal{X} \setminus \{x^*\}$ .

An alternative definition to be found in the literature is the following:

- (b)  $F$  is called strongly monotonic if  $F(\mathbf{R}') = F(\mathbf{R})$  or  $F(\mathbf{R}') = x^*$  for any alternative  $x^*$  and any two profiles  $\mathbf{R}$  and  $\mathbf{R}'$  satisfying  $N_{x^* \succ y}^{\mathbf{R}} \subseteq N_{x^* \succ y}^{\mathbf{R}'}$  and  $N_{y \succ z}^{\mathbf{R}} = N_{y \succ z}^{\mathbf{R}'}$  for all alternatives  $y, z \in \mathcal{X} \setminus \{x^*\}$ .

Explain each definition in plain English and briefly argue why it is a reasonable definition. Then check whether the two definitions are equivalent (proof or counterexample).

*Notation:* Recall that  $N_{x \succ y}^{\mathbf{R}}$  is the set of individuals who rank alternative  $x$  above alternative  $y$  under profile  $\mathbf{R}$ .

### Question 2 (10 marks)

Prove May's Theorem for the case of an even number of voters.

### Question 3 (10 marks)

Under the *antiplurality rule*, also known as the *veto rule*, the voters rank the alternatives, and the alternative(s) ranked last the least often win(s). The purpose of this question is to find a number of different characterisations of this rule.

- (a) Find a consensus criterion such that the antiplurality rule is characterised by that criterion and the *discrete distance*.
- (b) Find a way of measuring distances such that the antiplurality rule is characterised by the *unanimous winner* consensus criterion and that distance.
- (c) Find a noise model such that the corresponding maximum likelihood estimator is equivalent to the antiplurality rule.