# Analysis of One-to-One Matching Mechanisms via SAT Solving: Impossibilities for Universal Axioms

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# Talk Outline

I will try to demonstrate how the AI technique of *SAT solving* can be used for the *axiomatic analysis* of *matching mechanisms*.

- Model: one-to-one matching
- Preservation Theorem for axioms expressed in a formal language
- Approach to proving impossibility theorems via SAT solving
- Application: two impossibility theorems for matching

This talk is based on the following paper:

U. Endriss. Analysis of One-to-One Matching Mechanisms via SAT Solving: Impossibilities for Universal Axioms. AAAI-2020.

### The Model: One-to-One Matching

Two groups of *agents*:  $L_n = \{\ell_1, \ldots, \ell_n\}$  and  $R_n = \{r_1, \ldots, r_n\}$ . Each agent *ranks* all the agents on the opposite side of the market. Need *mechanism* to return one-to-one *matching* given such a *profile*. <u>Examples</u>: job markets, marriage markets, ...

Would like a mechanism with good normative properties (axioms):

- Stability: no  $\ell_i$  and  $r_j$  prefer one another over assigned partners
- *Strategyproofness:* best strategy is to truthfully report preferences
- Fairness: (for example) no advantage for one side of the market

Gale-Shapley (1962): stable ( $\checkmark$ ); strategyproof for left side ( $\checkmark$ ) but not right side ( $\checkmark$ ) of the market; unfair advantage for left side ( $\checkmark$ ).

D. Gale and L.S. Shapley. College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage. *American Mathematical Monthly*, 69:9–15, 1962.

#### Formal Language for Axioms

Would like to have formal language with clear semantics (i.e., a logic) to express axioms, to be able to get results for entire families of axioms. First-order logic with *sorts*, one for *profiles* and one for agent *indices*, with these basic ingredients:

- $p \triangleright (i, j)$  in profile p, agents  $\ell_i$  and  $r_j$  will get matched
- $j \succ_{p,i}^{L} j'$  in profile p, agent  $\ell_i$  prefers  $r_j$  to  $r_{j'}$  (also for R)
- $top_{p,i}^{L} = j$  in profile p, agent  $\ell_i$  most prefers  $r_j$  (also for R)
- $p \sim_i^{L} p'$  profiles p and p' are  $\ell_i$ -variants (also for R)
- $p \rightleftharpoons p'$  swapping sides in profile p yields profile p'
- $\forall_{\rm P}\,/\,\exists_{\rm P}$  and  $\forall_{\rm N}\,/\,\exists_{\rm N}\,$  quantifiers for variables of two sorts

Recall that axioms describe properties of mechanisms. So *truth* of a sentence  $\varphi$  in our logic is defined relative to a mechanism  $\mu$ .

### Example

 $\forall_{\mathbf{P}} p. \forall_{\mathbf{P}} p'. \forall_{\mathbf{N}} i. \forall_{\mathbf{N}} j. \forall_{\mathbf{N}} j' . \left[ (j \succ_{p,i}^{\mathbf{L}} j' \land p \sim_{i}^{\mathbf{L}} p') \rightarrow \neg (p \triangleright (i,j') \land p' \triangleright (i,j)) \right]$ 

#### **Another Example**

 $\forall_{\mathbf{P}} p. \forall_{\mathbf{N}} i. \forall_{\mathbf{N}} j. \left[ \left( top_{p,i}^{\mathbf{L}} = j \land top_{p,j}^{\mathbf{R}} = i \right) \rightarrow \left( p \triangleright (i,j) \right) \right]$ 

## **The Preservation Theorem**

Call a mechanism *top-stable* if it always matches all mutual favourites. Call an axiom *universal* if it can be written in the form  $\forall \vec{x}. \varphi(\vec{x})$ .

Similar to (one direction of) the Łoś-Tarski Theorem in model theory (about preservation of first-order  $\forall_1$ -formulas in substructures):

**Theorem 1** Let  $\mu^+$  be a top-stable mechanism of dimension n that satisfies a given set  $\Phi$  of universal axioms. If n > 1, then there also exists a top-stable mechanism  $\mu$  of dimension n - 1 that satisfies  $\Phi$ .

<u>Proof idea:</u> Construct larger profile in which extra agents most prefer each other and are least liked by everybody else.

<u>Corollary</u>: Enough to prove impossibility theorems for smallest n!

## **Proof Detail**

Given an (n-1)-dimensional profile, construct an *n*-dimensional one, in which top-stability forces the extra agents  $\ell_n$  and  $r_n$  to be matched:

### Counterexample

Preservation Theorem might look trivial. *Doesn't this always hold?* <u>No:</u> some axioms we can satisfy for large but not for small domains. Suppose we want to design a mechanism under which at least one

agent in each group gets assigned to their most preferred partner:

$$\forall_{\mathbf{P}} p. \exists_{\mathbf{N}} i. \forall_{\mathbf{N}} j. [(top_{p,i}^{\mathbf{L}} = j) \rightarrow (p \triangleright (i,j))] \land$$
  
$$\forall_{\mathbf{P}} p. \exists_{\mathbf{N}} j. \forall_{\mathbf{N}} i. [(top_{p,j}^{\mathbf{R}} = i) \rightarrow (p \triangleright (i,j))]$$

This is *not* universal! Mechanism exists for n = 3 but not for n = 2.

### **Proving Impossibility Theorems**

Suppose we want to prove an impossibility theorem of this form:

"for  $n \ge k$ , no matching mechanism satisfies all the axioms in  $\Phi$ "

Our Preservation Theorem permits us to proceed as follows:

- Check all axioms in  $\Phi$  indeed are universal axioms.
- Check  $\Phi$  includes (or implies) top-stability.
- Express all axioms for special case of n = k in *propositional CNF*.
- Using a *SAT solver*, confirm that this CNF is unsatisfiable.
- Using an *MUS extractor*, find a short proof of unsatisfiability.

For example, *stability* for n = 3 can be expressed in CNF like this:

$$\bigwedge_{p \in R_3!^3 \times L_3!^3} \bigwedge_{i \in \{1,2,3\}} \bigwedge_{j \in \{1,2,3\}} \bigwedge_{\substack{i' \text{ s.t. } p \text{ has } \\ \ell_i \succ_{r_j} \ell_{i'}}} \bigwedge_{\substack{j' \text{ s.t. } p \text{ has } \\ r_j \succ_{\ell_i} r_{j'} \neq_{\ell_i} r_{j'}}} (\neg x_{p \triangleright (i,j')} \lor \neg x_{p \triangleright (i',j)})$$

<u>Remark:</u> This is a conjunction of 419,904 clauses (big, yet manageable).

#### **Application: A Variant of Roth's Theorem**

Recall this classic result:

**Theorem 2 (Roth, 1982)** For  $n \ge 2$ , no matching mechanism for incomplete preferences is both stable and two-way strategyproof.

<u>Remark</u>: In our model (with complete preferences) true only for  $n \ge 3$ . We can use our approach to prove this stronger variant:


**Theorem 3** For  $n \ge 3$ , no matching mechanism is both top-stable and two-way strategyproof (even in our model).

By the Preservation Theorem, we are done if the claim holds for n = 3. SAT solver says it does, and MUS provides human-readable proof ( $\hookrightarrow$ ).

A.E. Roth. The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives. *Mathematics of Operations Research*, 7:617–628, 1982.

#### **Proof of Base Case**

Found MUS of 23 clauses, referencing 10 profiles. Proof visualisation:



Top-stability forces underlined matches. Colours indicate manipulation opportunities to be ruled out by SP. No matching left for centre profile.

#### **Application: Stability vs. Gender-Indifference**

Call a mechanism *gender-indifferent* if swapping the two sides of the market ("genders") yields the corresponding swap in the outcome:

$$\forall_{\mathsf{P}} p. \forall_{\mathsf{P}} p'. \forall_{\mathsf{N}} i. \forall_{\mathsf{N}} j. [(p \rightleftharpoons p') \rightarrow (p \triangleright (i, j) \rightarrow p' \triangleright (j, i))]$$

Bad news:

**Theorem 4** For  $n \ge 3$ , there exists no matching mechanism that is both stable and gender-indifferent.

Here the MUS extractor finds a particularly simple proof: it identifies a "swap-symmetric" profile for which there exists no admissible outcome (two matchings are ruled out by G-I and the other four by stability).

F. Masarani and S.S. Gokturk. On the Existence of Fair Matching Algorithms. *Theory and Decision*, 26(3):305–322, 1989.

# Last Slide

By the *Preservation Theorem*, for top-stable mechanisms and universal axioms, proving impossibilities can be automated. Specific results:

- Impossible to get *top-stability* and *two-way strategyproofness*.
- Impossible to get *stability* and *gender-indifference*.

[ tinyurl.com/satmatching ]