

Hardness

versus

Randomness

NOEL ARTECHE  
(Lund University)

Meta-Complexity Project — ILLC, Amsterdam  
(January 2024)

Randomness A language  $L \subseteq \{0,1\}^*$  is in ...

P BPP if  $\exists$  poly-time TM  $M(x, r)$  s.t.

$$x \in L \Rightarrow \Pr_r [M(x, r) = 1] \geq 2/3$$

$$x \notin L \Rightarrow \Pr_r [M(x, r) = 1] < 1/3$$

NP MA if  $\exists$  poly-time TM  $V$  and a polynomial  $P$

$$x \in L \Rightarrow \exists w \in \{0,1\}^{P(1x1)} : \Pr_r [V(x, w, r) = 1] \geq 2/3$$

$$x \notin L \Rightarrow \forall w \in \{0,1\}^{P(1x1)} : \Pr_r [V(x, w, r) = 1] < 1/3$$

P vs. NP

BPP vs. MA

But wait...  $NP$  is also  $\{L \subseteq \{0,1\}^* \mid L \leq_p SAT\}$ .


$\hookrightarrow \exists$  reductions  $R$  :  $x \in L \Leftrightarrow R(x) \in SAT$ .

So an alternative “randomized  $NP$ ” is

$$AM := \{L \subseteq \{0,1\}^* \mid L \leq_r SAT\}$$

Randomized reduction  $R$

$$\begin{cases} x \in L \Rightarrow \Pr_r [R(x,r) \in SAT] \geq 2/3 \\ x \notin L \Rightarrow \Pr_r [R(x,r) \in SAT] < 1/3 \end{cases}$$



Derandomization is about


making all these classes  
COLLAPSE!

# Non-uniformity buys you randomness

Theorem. (Adleman, 1977)

$$\text{BPP} \subseteq \text{P/poly.}$$

Proof. Suppose  $M(x, r)$  is a randomized machine. Do error-reduction. Suppose  $r \in \{0, 1\}^m$ .



In fact,  $\bigcup_{x_i \in \{0,1\}^n} \text{Bad}_i \not\subseteq \{0,1\}^m$   
so some  $r$  is "good" for all  $x$ .

# The HARNESS versus

## RANDOMNESS PARADIGM


- ▷ Nisan & Wigderson '88
  - ▷ Impagliazzo & Wigderson '97
- ↑ (literally  
their title!)



“CIRCUIT LOWER BOUNDS imply  
DERANDOMIZATION”

How can one derandomize?

Use FAKE randomness! a.k.a PSEUDORANDOMNESS



Def. (Complexity-theoretic PRG)

Circuit class


A function  $G : \{0,1\}^l \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$  is an  $\epsilon$ -PSEUDORANDOM GENERATOR of STRETCH  $S(l)$  AGAINST  $C$  if

(i)  $G$  runs in time  $2^{O(l)}$ ,

(ii)  $m = S(l)$ ;

(iii) for every circuit  $C$  in  $C$ ,

$$\left| \Pr_{r \in \{0,1\}^l} [C(G(r)) = 1] - \Pr_{u \in \{0,1\}^m} [C(u) = 1] \right| < \epsilon$$



For us,

$$\epsilon = 1/10$$

$$S(l) = 2^{O(l)}$$

$$C = \text{SIZE}(n^3)$$

Note! It suffices to derandomize  
 $\text{BPTIME}(n)$ , even assuming  
we use EXCTLY  $n$  random bits.

↪ PADDING:

If  $L \in \text{BPTIME}(n^c)$ , let

$$L' := \{x \cdot 1^{|x|^c} \mid x \in L\}.$$

Then,  $L' \in \text{BPTIME}(n)$ .

So  $\text{BPTIME}(n) \subseteq P$  suffices!

Idea : Use a PRG with exponential stretch!

$G : \{0,1\}^{O(\log n)} \xrightarrow[\sim \text{ time } O(n)]{} \{0,1\}^{O(n)}$  pseudorandom against  $\text{SIZE}(n^3)$ .

Simulate  $M(x, r)$  as follows :

1. Enumerate all SEEDS :  $s \in \{0,1\}^{O(\log n)}$

$$\hookrightarrow 2^{O(\log n)} = n^{O(1)}$$

2. Run  $M(x, G(s))$ . Record the output.

$$\hookrightarrow \text{Time } n^{O(1)}$$

3. If the majority accepted, accept.

We run in polynomial-time!

But did we fool  $M$ ?

Suppose NOT. i.e. there are infinitely many inputs  $x \in \{0,1\}^k$  s.t.

$$\Pr_r[M(x,r) = 1] \neq \Pr_s^{\pm \epsilon}[M(x, G(s)) = 1]$$

Consider the circuit  $C = M_x(r)$ ;  $|C| = O(n^2)$ .

But this circuit is a DISTINGUISHER!

$\hookrightarrow$  So  $G$  is NOT pseudorandom against  $\text{SIZE}(n^3)$ !

CONTRADICTION !

Actually, only need to fool  $\text{SIZE}(n^2)$  or even lower!


# CRYPTOGRAPHIC vs. COMPLEXITY-THEORETIC

PRGs

(HILL'99)

[Håstad-Impagliazzo-Levin-Luby '99]

If OWFs exist, then there are CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRGS.



RUNNING TIME	STRETCH	ADVERSARIES
$T$	$S(\ell)$	$C$

$\ell^c$

$\ell + 1$

BPP

$2^\ell$

$2^\ell$

SIZE( $n^3$ )

Yay! Under believable assumptions  
(i.e. circuit lower bound)

Nisan & Wigderson '88

Suppose there exists a function  
 $f \in E$  which is HARD ON AVERAGE  
for subexponential-size circuits.  
Then, "good" CT-PRGs exist.

- ▷  $E = \text{TIME}(2^{\alpha(n)})$  vs.  $\text{EXP} = \text{TIME}(2^{n^{\alpha(n)}})$
- ▷ "subexponential":  $\delta^{o(n)}$  i.e.  $\text{SUBEXP/poly} = \bigcap_{\epsilon > 0} \text{SIZE}(2^{n^{\epsilon}})$
- ▷ "on average":  $\forall C : \Pr_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} [C(x) = f(x)] < \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{|C|}$

### Nisan-Wigderson '85

If there is  $f \in E$  such that it is AVERAGE-CASE HARD for subexponential-size circuits, then  $P = BPP$

WORST-CASE  
TO AVERAGE-CASE  
REDUCTION!

### Impagliazzo-Wigderson '97

If there is  $f \in E$  such that it is WORST-CASE HARD for subexp-size circuits, then  $P = BPP$

So suppose I have a hard f . . .

HOW DO I BUILD A PRG?

TOY EXAMPLE : Stretch  $l+1$

Ingredients I have :

- $l$  truly random bits
- time  $2^{O(l)}$
- hard function  $f \in E$ ,  
 $f: \{0,1\}^l \rightarrow \{0,1\}$

Well...  $G(s) := (s, f(s))$

↑ one bit!

✓ Stretch  $l+1$   
✓ Time  $2^{O(l)}$

◻ Pseudorandom against  
? SIZE( $n^3$ )  
?

Proof. Use Yao's NEXT-BIT PREDICTOR THEOREM  
 (a.k.a. "unpredictability  $\Rightarrow$  pseudorandomness")

Let  $G : \{0,1\}^l \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ . Suppose there is  $S > O(n)$  and  $\epsilon > 0$  such that for all circuit of size  $2 \cdot S$ , for every  $i \in [m]$

$$\Pr_{s \in \{0,1\}^l} [C(G_1(s), G_2(s), \dots, G_{i-1}(s)) = G_i(s)] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\epsilon}{m}.$$

Then,  $G$  is  $\epsilon$ -pseudorandom against size  $S$ .

If  $G(s) = s \cdot f(s)$  is NOT pseudorandom, there is  $C$  and  $i \in [m]$  s.t.  $C$  predicts the  $i$ -th bit.  
 But  $i$  can only be  $m$ , since  $s \in \{0,1\}^l$  is actually random.

For  $l+2$  bits ...

$$G(s) := s_1 \cdots s_e \cdot f(s_1 \cdots s_{\ell/2}) \cdot f(s_{\ell/2+1} \cdots s_e)$$

In general,  $l+k$  bits by splitting  $s$  in  $\ell/k$  sections...

But limit is  $k=l$  i.e  $l+l = \underline{\underline{2l}}$

$$G(s) := s_1 \cdots s_e \cdot f(s_1) \cdots \cdots f(s_e)$$


If we want  $k \cdot l$  for  $k > 2$ ,  
NEW IDEAS NEEDED...

let alone  $2^l$  ...

In general, for

$$G : \{0,1\}^L \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$$

split  $s \in \{0,1\}^L$  into  $m$  overlapping sections



and output

$$G(s) := f(S_1) \cdot \dots \cdot f(S_m)$$

But the partition must be careful...

Idea: COMBINATORIAL DESIGNS

A collection  $A = \{S_1, \dots, S_m\}$ ,  $S_i \subseteq \{1, \dots, l\}$  is an  $(l, k, t)$ -DESIGN if

- i)  $|S_i| = t \quad \forall i \in [m]$
- ii)  $|S_i \cap S_j| \leq k \quad \forall i, j \in [m], i \neq j$

We view  $A$  as a 0/1  $m \times l$  matrix:


$$A = \begin{pmatrix} S_1 & | & 1 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & & : \\ S_2 & | & 1 & 1 & 0 & \cdots & & : \\ \vdots & | & 0 & 1 & 1 & \cdots & & : \\ S_m & | & \vdots & & & & & \\ & & 1 & 1 & 0 & \cdots & & l \end{pmatrix}$$

$a_{i,j} = 1$   
 $\Updownarrow$   
 $j \in S_i$

# The Nisan-Wigderson generator

Suppose  $f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$  is the HARD ON AVERAGE FUNCTION.

Suppose  $A = \{S_1, \dots, S_m\}$  is an  $(\ell, \log n, n)$  design.



Then,  $NW_A^f : \{0,1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$  in time  $n^{O(\ell)} \cdot 2^{O(m)} = 2^{O(n)}$

$$s \mapsto f(s_{\lceil s_1 \rceil}) \cdots f(s_{\lceil s_m \rceil})$$

is pseudorandom against  $\text{SIZE}(n^3)$ .

Stretch? To get  
 $m = n^{O(1)}$ , choose  
 $\ell = O(\log n)$ , then it our

Proof. Sophisticated version of the  $\ell+1$  generator argument, using Yao's thm.

There's something left...

Do  $(\ell, \log n, n)$ -DESIGNS  
even exist ???


Lemma. Let  $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ . There exists a family  
 $\{A_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  of  $(\ell, \log n, n)$ -designs.  
Furthermore, there's a poly-time TM  
 $M$  s.t.  $M(1^n) = A_n$ .

## Recap

$\exists f \in E$  subexponentially hard for circuits in WC

[IW'97]

$\Rightarrow \exists f \in E$  subexponentially hard for circuits on AVG




$BPTIME(n) \subseteq P$

(Yao)

||  
↓ [NW'88]

The  $NW^f$  generator has exponential stretch and is pseudorandom against  $SIZE(n^3)$

$\exists f \in E$  subexponentially hard for circuits on  $\text{AVG}$ .



$$\underline{MA} = NP$$

if  $\exists$  poly-time TM  $V$  and a polynomial  $P$

$$x \in L \Rightarrow \exists w \in \{0,1\}^{P(1|x)} : \Pr_r[V(x,w,r) = 1] \geq \gamma_3$$

$$x \notin L \Rightarrow \forall w \in \{0,1\}^{P(1|x)} : \Pr_r[V(x,w,r) = 1] < \gamma_3$$

$$AM = \{L \subseteq \{0,1\}^*: L \leq_r \text{SAT}\}$$

↳ randomized

reductions!

Randomized reduction  $R$

$$\forall x \in \{0,1\}^* \quad x \in L \Rightarrow R(x) \in \text{SAT} \text{ (w.h.p.)}$$

$$x \notin L \Rightarrow R(x) \notin \text{SAT} \text{ (w.h.p.)}$$

$$NP \stackrel{?}{=} AM$$

$\exists f \in E$  subexponentially hard for circuits on  $\text{Avg.}$



$\exists f \in E$  subexponentially hard for circuits on  $\text{Avg.}$ , even in the presence of SAT oracle gates

## Recap


Believable, but HARD...

NATURAL PROOFS

[IW'97]

$\exists f \in E$  subexponentially hard for circuits in WC.

$\Rightarrow \exists f \in E$  subexponentially hard for circuits on Avg



(Yao)

$BPTIME(n) \subseteq P$

Can we find an alternative route?

The NW<sup>f</sup> generator has exponential stretch and is pseudorandom against SIZE( $n^3$ )

Kabanets & Impagliazzo '03... No,


## POLYNOMIAL IDENTITY TESTING (PIT)

Input : Arithmetic circuit  $C$  over  $\mathbb{Z}$ .

Goal : Is  $C \equiv 0$  ?

Fact :

$\text{PIT} \in \text{COP} \subseteq \text{BPP}$ .



If  $\text{BPP} = \text{P}$ , then of course  $\text{PIT} \in \text{P}$ ...

and the converse is almost true!

↳ "PIT is 'derandomization-complete'"

Theorem (Kabanets - Impagliazzo '03)

Suppose  $\text{PIT} \in \text{P}$ . Then, either

$\text{NEXP} \notin \text{P/poly}$  or  $\text{Perm} \notin \text{AlgP/poly}$ .

So... randomness is useless?

RANGE AVOIDANCE (a.k.a. Avolo)

↪ Input: circuit  $C : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{n+1}$

↪ Task: output  $y \in \{0,1\}^{n+1}$  s.t.  $y \notin \text{rng}(C)$

$$\forall x \in \{0,1\}^n : C(x) \neq y$$

Prop. RANGE AVOIDANCE  $\in FBPP$ .

Proof. Choose  $y \in \{0,1\}^{n+1}$ .  $\Pr_{y \in \{0,1\}^{n+1}} [\forall x : C(x) \neq y] \geq \frac{1}{2}$ .

□

So...  $FP = FBPP$  and

RANGE AVOIDANCE  $\in FP$ ?

Theorem (korten, 2021) "The Hardest Explicit Construction"

If RANGE AVOIDANCE  $\in \text{FP}$  (or even  $\text{FP}^{\text{NP}}$ ),  
then there exists  $f \in E$  without  
Subexponential-size circuits.

Proof. Consider the circuit  $T: \{0,1\}^{n^c} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2^n}$   
mapping a circuit of size  $n^c$  to  
its truth table.

Clearly, some truth-tables don't have  
 $n^c$ -circuits.

An algorithm for RANGE AVOIDANCE would  
give us a "hard truth table".

In fact, under CRYPTOGRAPHIC ASSUMPTIONS,  
RANGE AVOIDANCE  $\notin \text{FP}$  unless  $\text{NP} = \text{coNP}$ .

(Li-Huang-Williams '21)

Meta-Complexity paper

Actually...

Theorem. (Aaronson-Buhrman-Kretschmer '23)

Unconditionally,  $\text{FBPP} \neq \text{FP}$ .

So randomness IS useful...  
sometimes.

# Derandomization in PH

?

Recall we don't know if  $BPP \subseteq NP$ .

Theorem. (Sipser - Gács - Lautemann)

$$BPP \subseteq \Sigma_2 P \cap \Pi_2 P.$$

Proof.  $BPP \subseteq \Sigma_2 P$ .

$$\hookrightarrow co\ BPP \subseteq co\ \Sigma_2 P = \Pi_2 P$$

" "  
 $BPP$

- So,
- 1) Guess hard truth table  $f$ . ( $\exists$ )
  - 2) Check NO small circuit computes it ( $\forall$ ).
  - 3) Use  $NW^f$ .
- QED.

## Recap

- **HARDNESS** can be traded for **RANDOMNESS**: following the NISAN-WIGDERSON paradigm of COMPLEXITY-THEORETIC PRGs,  
 $\exists \text{ HARD function} \Rightarrow P = BPP$   
(a.k.a. Circuit lower bounds)  $\Rightarrow NP = MA = AM$
- Unfortunately, circuit lower bounds are needed for DERANDOMIZATION.
- In meta-complexity, reductions are often RANDOMIZED... in the hope of DERANDOMIZING later.