Patrick Lederer

Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Amsterdam

Email: p.lederer@uva.nl
Address: Institute of Logic, Language, and Computation, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 900, Room L6.39,
1098 XH Amsterdam, The Netherlands

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Short Bio

I am a postdoctoral researcher in the Computational Social Choice group of Prof. Ulle Endriss at the Institute of Logic, Language, and Computation at the University of Amsterdam. Being a part of the ADDI project, my research focuses on (computational) social choice with a particular focus on axiomatics and the design of normatively appealing mechanisms for voting, matching, and assignment.
Prior to joining the ILLC, I obtained my PhD in computer science at the Technical University of Munich under the supervision of Prof. Felix Brandt. I also worked as a postdoc in the group of Prof. Haris Aziz at the University of New South Wales for roughly two years.

Publications

Working Papers
  1. P. Lederer. Proportional representation in rank aggregation. 2025. Working paper. [ pdf ]
  2. P. Lederer. Strategyproof randomized social choice for restricted sets of utility functions.2025. Working paper. [ pdf ]
  3. P. Lederer. Robust voting rules on the interval domain. 2024. Working paper. [ pdf ]
Journal Publications
  1. E. Elkind, M. Greger, P. Lederer, W. Suksompong, and N. Teh. Settling the score: Portioning with cardinal preferences. 2026. Artificial Intelligence, 352, 104487, 2026 [ pdf | link]
  2. H. Aziz, P. Lederer, X. Lu, M. Suzuki, and J. Vollen. Approximately fair and population consistent budget division via simple payment schemes. Games and Economic Behavior, 154:208-225, 2025. [ link | pdf ]
  3. P. Lederer. Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule. Journal of Economic Theory, 218:105836, 2024. [ link | pdf ]
  4. F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen. Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. Social Choice and Welfare, 63:19–55, 2024. [ link | pdf ]
  5. F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong. Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences. Games and Economic Behavior, 142:266-291, 2023. [ link | pdf ]
  6. F. Brandt and P. Lederer. Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness. Theoretical Economics, 18(2):837-883, 2023. [ link | pdf]
  7. F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer. On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice functions. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 73:1093-1130, 2022. [ link | pdf ]
Conference Publications
  1. M. Eberl and P. Lederer. The impossibility of strategyproof rank aggregation. In Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 2026. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]
  2. F. Brandt, H. Chen, C. Dong, P. Lederer, and A. Schlenga. Majoritarian assignment rules. In Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), 2026. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]
  3. H. Aziz, P. Lederer, D. Peters, J. Peters, and A. Ritossa. Committee monotonicity and proportional representation for ranked preferences. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), page 896, 2025. [ link | pdf ]
  4. H. Aziz, P. Lederer, X. Lu, M. Suzuki, and J. Vollen. Approximately fair and population consistent budget division via simple payment schemes. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), page 349, 2025. [ link | pdf ]
  5. H. Aziz, H. Chan, P. Lederer, S. Narang, and T. Walsh. Distance preservation games. In Proceedings of the 34th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 3735-3743, 2025. [ link| pdf]
  6. F. Frank and P. Lederer. The metric distortion of randomized social choice functions: C1 maximal lottery rules and simulations. In Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 785-793, 2025. [ link | pdf ]
  7. F. Brandt and P. Lederer. Weak strategyproofness in randomized social choice. In Proceedings of the 39th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 13667-13674, 2025. [ link | pdf ]
  8. P. Lederer, D. Peters, and T. Wąs. The squared Kemeny rule for averaging rankings. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), page 755. 2024. [ link | pdf ]
  9. M. Bullinger, C. Dong, P. Lederer, and C. Mehler. Participation incentives in approval-based committee elections. In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 9546-9554. 2024. [ link | pdf ]
  10. C. Dong and P. Lederer. Refined characterizations of approval-based committee scoring rules. In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2024, pages 9670-9678. [ link | pdf ]
  11. C. Dong and P. Lederer. Characterizations of sequential valuation rules. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1697-1705, 2023. [ link | pdf ]
  12. T. Delemazure, T. Demeulemeester, M. Eberl, J. Israel, and P. Lederer. Strategyproofness and proportionality in party-approval multiwinner elections. In Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5591-5599, 2023. [ link | pdf ]
  13. F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and S. Tausch. Strategyproof social decision schemes on super Condorcet domains. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1734-1742, 2023. [ link | pdf ]
  14. F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong. Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences. In Proceedings of the 31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 130-136, 2022. [ link | pdf ]
  15. F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen. Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 181-189, 2022. [ link | pdf ]
  16. P. Lederer. Strategyproof randomized social choice for restricted sets of utility functions. In Proceedings of the 30th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 306-312, 2021. [ link | pdf ]
  17. F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer. On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice functions. In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 251-259, 2021. [ link | pdf ]
Theses
  1. P. Lederer. Strategic manipulation in social choice theory. PhD thesis, Technical University of Munich, 2024. [ link | pdf ]
  2. P. Lederer. Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions. Master's thesis, Technical University of Munich, 2020. [ pdf ]

Teaching

Courses
Student projects
  • Taste of Research project Rank aggregation in Theory and Practice (Rayan Sharara, 2025)
  • Honour's thesis Axiomatic properties in proportional multi-winner ranked voting (Angus Ritossa, 2024)
  • Master's thesis ε‐Strategyproofness Social Decision Schemes (Jonathan Stein, 2024)
  • Master's thesis Strategyproofness in Approval-based Committee Elections: Domain Restrictions and Iterative Voting (Evghenii Beriozchin, 2024)
  • Interdisciplinary project A Quantitative Analysis of Set Extensions for Social Choice Theory (Ahmet Semiz, 2023)
  • Master's thesis Metric Distortion in Randomized Social Choice (Fabian Frank, 2023)
  • Bachelor's thesis Modeling Utility Functions in Social Choice Theory (Michelle Heinz, 2022)
  • Bachelor's thesis Random Assignment with Pairwise Comparison Preferences (Patryk Morawski, 2022)
  • Master's thesis Understanding the SD impossibiliy theorem (Alexander Thole, 2021)
  • Master's thesis Characterizing the Condorcet Rule (Sascha Tausch, 2021)
  • Master's thesis Non-manipulable Social Desicision Schemes (Rene Romen, 2020)

Community Service

Refereeing Conferences and Workshops
Refereeing Journals
  • Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (JAIR)
  • Theoretical Economics (TE)
  • Games and Economic Behavior (GEB)
  • Social Choice and Welfare (SCW)
  • Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (JAAMAS)
  • AMS Contemporary Mathematics Series (CMS)
  • Mathematical Social Sciences (MSS)
  • Theory of Computing Systems (ToCS)
  • Artificial Intelligence (AIJ)
  • Review of Economic Design (RoED)
  • Discrete Applied Mathematics (DAM)
  • Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Ann. Math. Artif. Intell.)
  • Journal of Law and Economics (JLE)
  • Journal of Mathematical Economics (JME)
  • Economics Letters (Econ. Lett.)