

Introduction to Modern Cryptography



5th lecture:

Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) and CCA security

last time:

- pseudorandom functions
- chosen-plaintext security

5th lecture (today):

- Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
- CCA security

	secret key	public key
confidentiality	private-key encryption	public-key encryption
authentication	message authentication codes (MAC)	digital signatures

Motivation

- company order
- email, SMS, etc.
- banking transaction
- contracts
- software patches
- ...

integrity and **authenticity** are often more basic needs than secrecy

Mihir Bellare



Phillip Rogaway




2000:


- security definition of MACs
- security of CBC MAC

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CBC encrypt vs CBC-MAC



$$t_0 = 0^n$$



tricky details!
see exercises

Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCA)

$$\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{cca}}(n)$$

adversary \mathcal{A}

m_0, m_1

$\leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Enc}_k(\cdot), \text{Dec}_k(\cdot)}(|n|)$

$|m_0| = |m_1|$

$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Enc}_k(\cdot), \text{Dec}_k(\cdot)}(c)$

challenger

$k \leftarrow \text{Gen}(|n|)$

$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$

$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_k(m_b)$

$b = b'$

$b \neq b'$

↓
1

↓
0

adv \mathcal{A} cannot ask
to decrypt c !

Trouble with AuthThenEncrypt

$$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{k_1}(m \parallel \text{Mac}_{k_2}(m))$$

$$\text{Trans}(0) = 00$$

$$\text{Trans}(1) = 01 \text{ or } 10$$

$$\text{Trans}^{-1}(00) = 0$$

$$\text{Trans}^{-1}(01) = 1$$

$$\text{Trans}^{-1}(10) = 1$$

$$\text{Trans}^{-1}(11) = \perp$$

$$\text{Enc}_k(m) = \text{Enc}'_k(\text{Trans}(m)) = (r, F_k(r) \oplus \text{Trans}(m))$$

Enc is CPA-secure, but AtE can be CCA-attacked!

$$\begin{aligned} c &= \text{Enc}'_{k_1}(\text{Trans}(m \parallel \text{Mac}_{k_2}(m))) \\ &= (r, F_{k_1}(r) \oplus \text{Trans}(m \parallel \text{Mac}_{k_2}(m))) \end{aligned}$$

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flipping the first two bits of this block and trying $\text{Dec}(\)$ reveals the first bit of m

Bruce Schneier



- wrote several books and articles about computer security
- influential blog and newsletter
- designed crypto algorithms
- board member of Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
- visit his official site, and the funny Bruce Schneier Facts