The pragmatics and prosody of declarative 'questions' (and interrogative questions)

Matthijs Westera

Universitat Pompeu Fabra (University of Amsterdam)

Konstanz, 23-11-2017

How does communication work?

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### HOW TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOUR SPOUSE WITHOUT FIGHTING IN 7 SIMPLE STEPS

### STEP 1

Pay attention to your spouse whenever you have a conversation.

### STEP 2

on't yell at your spouse when you are trying to conve a message or talking to each other.

#### STEP 3

Put yourself in your spouse's shoes so you can see the issue from your their point of view.

### STEP 4

Confirm understanding by asking your spouse if they understand what you are communicating to them.

### STEP 5

Try using different communication methods when your spouse does not understand something you said.

#### STEP 6

Take a break if you are not making progress mmunicating your thoughts or start to feel frustrate

#### STEP

Apply the above steps every time you communicate with your spouse.

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(1) A: We ran out of vegetables.

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What justifies this new belief?



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"Compliance marking". But how?

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- 1. Introduction & core assumption
- 2. The empirical phenomenon
- 3. Basic assumptions about pragmatics
- 4. Explaining the three main characteristics
- 5. Conclusion

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Westera (2013): final rise conveys a maxim suspension.

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- e.g., overall volume, pitch, speed, extent of pitch excursions;
- these correlate in a continuous way with 'meaning'.

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What the ICM theory predicts depends on:

- how exactly the maxims are defined;
- when it is permissible to violate or risk violating a maxim; and
- disambiguation by context and paralinguistic cues.

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From Farkas & Roelofsen 2017:

- (8) a. 'Is it raining', she wondered/asked.
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  - d. This is a beautiful sunset, isn't it?

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  - c. (?) This is a beautiful sunset?
  - d. This is a beautiful sunset, isn't it?

(2) A: (Enters with an umbrella.)B: It's raining?

From Gunlogson 2003:

(10) (At a committee hearing:)

a. Are you a member of the Communist party?

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 (11) (On the phone with Schiphol information.) [from Beun 2000]
 Caller: Hello. I have to go to Barcelona, from Amsterdam. Can you tell me which flights leave next Sunday?
 Agent: Just a moment. ... Yes, there are several flights. One leaves at 9.10, one at 11.10, and one at 17.30.
 Caller: The flight takes about three hours?

(2) A: (Enters with an umbrella.)

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#### (12) (With no contextual setup:)

a. Is the weather supposed to be nice this weekend?

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Hence:

- Speaker bias: the speaker considers the proposition expressed likely (for whatever reason, contextual or otherwise);
- Badness out of the blue: What needs to be contextually present is not evidence, but something like the *topic of discourse*.

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### Outline

- 1. Introduction & core assumption
- 2. The empirical phenomenon
- 3. Basic assumptions about pragmatics
- 4. Explaining the three main characteristics
- 5. Conclusion

Preview of the explanations

# [SPOILER ALERT]

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Speaker bias:

Badness out-of-the-blue:

# [SPOILER ALERT]

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
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
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



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


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





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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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





(14) (It's common knowledge that J+M never attend rainy parties.)

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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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#### Assumption 2: The maxims

- Quality: Your intent is true.
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- Quantity: Your intent entails all answers to the QUD that you believe are true.
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- these details were put into place to fit intonation;
- but they have wider implications.

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- and there are no communication problems;
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Also interesting:

The only reason to suspend Quality is a clash with Relation, i.e., if there is no answer to the QUD which the speaker believes is true.

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Concretely, with the current definition:

► Quality suspensions can be blamed only on a clash with Relation.

## Outline

- 1. Introduction & core assumption
- 2. The empirical phenomenon
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 don't risk violating Quality if *opting out*, by asking an interrogative question, would have been a good alternative;

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
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<sup>(\*\*\*:</sup> What about other ways of coping with a Quality/Relation clash?)





Suppose Quality is twice as important as Relation...

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- (15) A: Hey B, guess what the weather is like.
  - B: I have absolutely no idea; I haven't been outside in days.
  - A: Guess!!!
  - B: Fine. It's raining?

Let's remind ourselves:

(13) (On the phone with Schiphol information.)



Agent: One leaves at 9.10, one at 11.10, and one at 17.30. Caller: The flight takes about three hours?

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- the required contextual setup is not the speaker bias;
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


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


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
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
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
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Complication:

whether QUD is already 'on the table' is partly up to the speaker...



No apparent complementary distribution (Gunlogson, 2003):

- (16) A: (Enters with an umbrella.)
  - B: a. It's raining?
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- the context presents an *opportunity* for the speaker to present the QUD as being already 'on the table';
- ▶ and the speaker decides, for rhetorical reasons (etc.), to take it up.



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## 5.1. Conclusion

Rising declaratives are often characterized in terms of incompleteness, forward-looking, etc.

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
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- the ICM theory predicts the various uses of rising declaratives;
- while also explaining core characteristics of, in this case, the Quality-suspending kind.

## 5.2. Further applications



## 5.3. Returning to "Prelude (1/2): a simple question"

#### How does communication work?

For example:

(17) A: We ran out of vegetables.

Hearing (1), we come to believe that they ran out of vegetables.

What justifies this new belief?

