QUDs, brevity, and
the asymmetry of alternatives

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Empirical argument:

- ▶ Even if relevance *can be* asymmetrical...
- ▶ it is sometimes symmetrical in cases where exhaustivity arises.

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4. be necessary for the exhaustivity implicature itself to be relevant;
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- Spoiler: my proposal will predict that (3) is possible.

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- **Horn scale:** (possibly) lexical knowledge about what is *typically* co-relevant.
- **Hirschberg (ad hoc) scale:** representation of what is *currently* relevant.

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
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   B: *John* was there.   *(implied: not Mary, not Bill)*

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   B: *John* was there.   *(implied: not Mary, not Bill)*

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sentence meaning

what is uttered

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goals

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contents

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QUDs   *beliefs*

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◄ MANNER

contents

◄ Semantics

what is uttered

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
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   B: *John* was there.   *(implied: not Mary, not Bill)*

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3.3. Towards a solution

goals

QUDs   *beliefs*

intents

contents

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QUDs   *beliefs*

intents

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
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

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   - ▶ a symmetrical QUD would predict a contradiction;

Outline

goals

QUDs   *beliefs*

intents

contents

"John was there." *what is uttered*

goals

QUDs   *beliefs*

?

intents

◄ MANNER

contents

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contents

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1. My proposal doesn't rely on lexical brevity differences – only on *implicature* being *implicit*.

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
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goals

QUDs   *beliefs*

?

intents

contents

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4.2. Brief comparison (2/2): Scales

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
Depending on what scales are supposed to be:

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And lastly:

- ▶ various implications for the different pragmatic/grammatical approaches to exhaustivity.

Acknowledgments

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