

# A proof-theoretic view on individual and collective preference

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- ▶ **Proof-theoretic methods in logic for social choice.**
- ▶ Logic as axiomatic method.
- ▶ Logic beyond axioms: rule-based calculi.
- ▶ Method of proof analysis.
- ▶ Formalize the proofs of impossibility theorems.
- ▶ “Inferentialize” social choice theory.

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# Hilbert-style proof theory for individual preference

- ▶ First-order language where atoms

$x \geq y$  are interpreted as  $x$  is at least good as  $y$

- ▶ First-order axiomatization

Axioms for  $\forall, \wedge, \rightarrow, \perp$

Modus Ponens

$\forall x(x \geq x)$   $\geq$  is reflexive

$\forall x \forall y \forall z(x \geq y \wedge y \geq z \rightarrow x \geq z)$   $\geq$  is transitive

$\forall x \forall y(x \geq y \vee y \geq x)$   $\geq$  is total



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# Hilbert-style proof theory for individual preference

- ▶ Definitions of  $>$  (strict preference) and  $\sim$  (indifference)

$$x > y \quad =_{df} \quad x \geq y \text{ and } y \not\geq x$$

$$x \sim y \quad =_{df} \quad x \geq y \text{ and } y \geq x$$

- ▶ Theorems

$\vdash \forall x(x \sim x)$	$\geq$ is reflexive
$\vdash \forall x \forall y \forall z(x \sim y \wedge y \sim z \rightarrow x \sim z)$	$\sim$ is transitive
$\vdash \forall x \forall y(x \sim y \rightarrow y \sim x)$	$\sim$ is symmetric
$\vdash \forall x(x \not\geq x)$	$\geq$ is irreflexive
$\vdash \forall x \forall y \forall z(x > y \wedge y > z \rightarrow x > z)$	$>$ is transitive
$\vdash \forall x \forall y(x > y \rightarrow y \not\geq x)$	$\sim$ is asymmetric

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$$\begin{aligned}x > y &=_{df} x \geq y \text{ and } y \not\geq x \\x \sim y &=_{df} x \geq y \text{ and } y \geq x\end{aligned}$$

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# Gentzen-style proof theory for individual preference

- ▶ Systematic proof-search procedure.

- ▶ Sequent calculi

$\Gamma, \Delta$     multisets (lists without order) of formulas

$\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta$     interpreted as  $\bigwedge \Gamma \rightarrow \bigvee \Delta$

- ▶ One axiom.
- ▶ Logical rules.
- ▶ Structural rules.

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# Gentzen-style proof theory for individual preference

- ▶ Weakening, Contraction and Cut

$$\frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \varphi} \text{ W} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{\varphi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} \text{ W}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \varphi, \varphi}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \varphi} \text{ C} \qquad \frac{\varphi, \varphi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{\varphi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} \text{ C}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \varphi \quad \varphi, \Gamma' \Rightarrow \Delta'}{\Gamma, \Gamma' \Rightarrow \Delta', \Delta} \text{ CUT}$$

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$$P, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, P$$

$$\overline{\perp, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}$$

$$\frac{\varphi, \psi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{\varphi \wedge \psi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \varphi \quad \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \psi}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \varphi \wedge \psi}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \varphi \quad \psi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{\varphi \rightarrow \psi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}$$

$$\frac{\varphi, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \psi}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \varphi \rightarrow \psi}$$

$$\frac{\varphi(x), \forall x \varphi(x), \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{\forall x \varphi(x), \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \varphi(y)}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta, \forall x \varphi(x)} \quad y \notin \Gamma, \Delta$$

**G3c**

where  $P$  is either  $x \geq y$  or  $x > y$  or else  $x \sim y$ .

# Cut admissibility in presence of axioms

- ▶ Rules for  $\geq$ ,  $\sim$  and  $>$  s.t. admissibility results preserved

- ▶ **G3c** +

$\Rightarrow x \sim x$  ( $\sim$  is reflexive)

$x \sim y \Rightarrow y \sim x$  ( $\sim$  is symmetric)

$x \sim y, y \sim z \Rightarrow x \sim z$  ( $\sim$  is transitive)

- ▶ Counter-example to cut admissibility.

$$\frac{x \sim y \Rightarrow y \sim x \quad y \sim x, x \sim z \Rightarrow y \sim z}{x \sim y, x \sim z \Rightarrow y \sim z} \text{ CUT}$$

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- ▶ Systematic approaches: cut admissibility once and for all.
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# Axioms as inference rules

- ▶ Extension by inference rules

- ▶ **G3c** +

$$\frac{x \sim x, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} \textit{Ref}$$

$$\frac{y \sim x, x \sim y, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{x \sim y, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} \textit{Sym}$$

$$\frac{x \sim z, x \sim y, y \sim z, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{x \sim y, y \sim z, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} \textit{Trans}$$

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- ▶  $x \sim y, x \sim z \Rightarrow y \sim z$  has a cut-free derivation

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  - ▶ applied bottom-up
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# Axioms as inference rules

- ▶ What class of axioms can be rearranged into rules?
- ▶ Regular axioms, *i.e.* universal closure of

$$P_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge P_m \rightarrow Q_1 \vee \cdots \vee Q_n$$

- ▶ corresponds to

$$\frac{Q_1, P_1, \dots, P_m, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta \quad \dots \quad Q_n, P_1, \dots, P_m, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{P_1, \dots, P_m, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} \text{Reg}$$

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- ▶ Rules for  $>$

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# Gentzen-style proof theory for individual preference

- ▶ Let **GP** be **G3c** + rules for  $\succcurlyeq$ ,  $\succ$  and  $\sim$
- ▶ In **GP**
  - ▶ Weakening is admissible
  - ▶ Contraction is admissible
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# Gentzen-style proof theory for collective preference

- ▶ From individual to collective preference
- ▶ Fix  $B = \{1 \dots n\}$  a set of voters
- ▶ Indexed preferences:  $\geq_i$ ,  $>_i$  and  $\sim_i$ , for  $i \in B$
- ▶ Social choice rules as rules of inference.

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- ▶ Paretian collective preference
- ▶ Everybody considers  $x$  as good as  $y$  but somebody strictly prefers  $x$  to  $y$
- ▶ Formally,

$$x \geq_B y \quad =_{df} \quad \bigwedge_{i=1}^n x \geq_i y$$

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- ▶ Assume  $B = \{1, 2\}$ . The rules for  $\succcurlyeq_B$  and  $>_B$  are

$$\frac{x \succcurlyeq_{12} y, x \succcurlyeq_B y, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{x \succcurlyeq_B y, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} \quad \frac{x \succcurlyeq_B y, x \succcurlyeq_{12} y, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{x \succcurlyeq_{12} y, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}$$

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- ▶ Some known results:
- ▶  $\succcurlyeq_B$  is reflexive, if each  $\succcurlyeq_i$  is reflexive too.

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- ▶ Some known results:
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$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\frac{x \succcurlyeq_B z, x \succcurlyeq_2 z, x \succcurlyeq_1 z, y \succcurlyeq_1 z, y \succcurlyeq_2 z, x \succcurlyeq_1 y, x \succcurlyeq_2 y, x \succcurlyeq_B y, y \succcurlyeq_B z \Rightarrow x \succcurlyeq_B z}{x \succcurlyeq_2 z, x \succcurlyeq_1 z, y \succcurlyeq_1 z, y \succcurlyeq_2 z, x \succcurlyeq_1 y, x \succcurlyeq_2 y, x \succcurlyeq_B y, y \succcurlyeq_B z \Rightarrow x \succcurlyeq_B z}}{x \succcurlyeq_1 z, y \succcurlyeq_1 z, y \succcurlyeq_2 z, x \succcurlyeq_1 y, x \succcurlyeq_2 y, x \succcurlyeq_B y, y \succcurlyeq_B z \Rightarrow x \succcurlyeq_B z}}{y \succcurlyeq_1 z, y \succcurlyeq_2 z, x \succcurlyeq_1 y, x \succcurlyeq_2 y, x \succcurlyeq_B y, y \succcurlyeq_B z \Rightarrow x \succcurlyeq_B z}}{x \succcurlyeq_1 y, x \succcurlyeq_2 y, x \succcurlyeq_B y, y \succcurlyeq_B z \Rightarrow x \succcurlyeq_B z}}{x \succcurlyeq_B y, y \succcurlyeq_B z \Rightarrow x \succcurlyeq_B z}}$$

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- ▶  $\succcurlyeq_B$  is not total, although each  $\succcurlyeq_i$  is.
- ▶ The sequent  $\Rightarrow x \succcurlyeq_B y \vee y \succcurlyeq_B x$  is not derivable
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$$xMy \quad =_{df} \quad \bigvee_{A \subseteq B: |A| \geq \frac{n}{2}} \bigwedge_{i \in A} x \succsim_i y$$

- ▶ With 3 voters

$$xMy \quad =_{df} \quad (x \succsim_{12} y) \vee (x \succsim_{31} y) \vee (x \succsim_{23} y)$$



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- ▶ The rules for  $M$  are

$$\frac{xMy, x \succcurlyeq_{12} y, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{x \succcurlyeq_{12} y, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} \quad \frac{xMy, x \succcurlyeq_{31} y, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{x \succcurlyeq_{31} y, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta} \quad \frac{xMy, x \succcurlyeq_{23} y, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{x \succcurlyeq_{23} y, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}$$

$$\frac{x \succcurlyeq_{12} y, xMy, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta \quad x \succcurlyeq_{31} y, xMy, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta \quad x \succcurlyeq_{23} y, xMy, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}{xMy, \Gamma \Rightarrow \Delta}$$

# Conclusions

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