Approval Voting

On this page you can find the Prolog programs used in my papers on Approval Voting to derive results on the absence of incentives to vote insincerely under certain assumptions on how voters extend their preferences over candidates to sets of candidates and for elections with a small number of candidates.

• U. Endriss. Sincerity and Manipulation under Approval Voting.
  Working Paper, Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation, University of Amsterdam, October 2009.
  Prolog program: av.pl
   
• U. Endriss. Vote Manipulation in the Presence of Multiple Sincere Ballots.
  In D. Samet, editor, Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK-2007), pages 125-134, Presses Universitaires de Louvain, June 2007.
  Prolog program: tark07.pl

Both programs have been tested under SWI-Prolog.

Feedback welcome: ulle.endriss@uva.nl.