Objection 1. It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is not to be added to an
essential term in God. For, according to the Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not
with another." But God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we cannot say that
God is alone.
Objection 2. Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God can be predicated of every
person "per se," and of all the persons together; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we
can say the Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 9):
"We must consider the opinion that the Father is not true God alone." Therefore God cannot be
said to be alone.
Objection 3. Further if this expression "alone" is joined to an essential term, it would be so joined
as regards either the personal predicate or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as
it is false to say, "God alone is Father," since man also is a father; nor, again, can it be applied as
regards the latter, for, if this saying were true, "God alone creates," it would follow that the "Father
alone creates," as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father; and it would be false, as the
Son also creates. Therefore this expression "alone" cannot be joined to an essential term in God.
On the contrary, It is said, "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God" (1 Tim. 1:17).
I answer that, This term "alone" can be taken as a categorematical term, or as a
syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one which ascribes absolutely its meaning to
a given "suppositum"; as, for instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man." If the term
"alone" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any term in God; for it would mean
solitude in the term to which it is joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is
above stated (2). A syncategorematical term imports the order of the predicate to the subject; as
this expression "every one" or "no one"; and likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other
"suppositum" from the predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone writes," we do not mean that
Socrates is solitary, but that he has no companion in writing, though many others may be with him.
In this way nothing prevents the term "alone" being joined to any essential term in God, as
excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we said "God alone is eternal," because
nothing but God is eternal.
Reply to Objection 1. Although the angels and the souls of the saints are always with God,
nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude
is not removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone is said to be
alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise, God
would be alone or solitary, though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons
were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does not take away absolute
solitude from God; much less does it remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.
Reply to Objection 2. This expression "alone," properly speaking, does not affect the predicate,
which is taken formally, for it refers to the "suppositum," as excluding any other suppositum from
the one which it qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can be applied either to subject
or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"--that is, no one else--"runs: and Socrates runs
only"--that is, he does nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God alone, or
the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be assumed in the predicate, as, for
instance, "The Trinity is God Who alone is God." In that sense it can be true to say that the Father
is that God Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the predicate, and not to the
"suppositum." So, when Augustine says that the Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity is God
alone, he speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, "To the King of ages, invisible, the
only God," as applying not to the Father, but to the Trinity alone.
Reply to Objection 3. In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an essential term. For this
proposition, "God alone is Father," can mean two things, because the word "Father" can signify the
person of the Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can signify that relation
only; and thus it is false, because the relation of paternity is found also in others, though not in a
univocal sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor, does it follow, "therefore the
Father alone creates," because, as logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it
is joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an individual
contained in that term: for instance, from the premiss, "Man alone is a mortal rational animal," we
cannot conclude, "therefore Socrates alone is such."
Objection 1. It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term, even
though the predicate is common. For our Lord speaking to the Father, said: "That they may know
Thee, the only true God" (Jn. 17:3). Therefore the Father alone is true God.
Objection 2. Further, He said: "No one knows the Son but the Father" (Mt. 11:27); which means
that the Father alone knows the Son. But to know the Son is common (to the persons). Therefore
the same conclusion follows.
Objection 3. Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the
term to which it is joined. Hence it does not exclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not
follow that if we say "Socrates alone is white," that therefore "his hand is not white," or that "man is
not white." But one person is in the concept of another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son;
and conversely. Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is God, we do not exclude the Son, nor
the Holy Ghost; so that such a mode of speaking is true.
Objection 4. Further, the Church sings: "Thou alone art Most High, O Jesus Christ."
On the contrary, This proposition "The Father alone is God" includes two assertions--namely, that the Father is God, and that no other besides the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for the Son is another from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is false, The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings.
I answer that, When we say, "The Father alone is God," such a proposition can be taken in several
senses. If "alone" means solitude in the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in
a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways. For if it exclude (all
others) from the form of the subject, it is true, the sense being "the Father alone is God"--that is,
"He who with no other is the Father, is God." In this way Augustine expounds when he says (De
Trin. vi, 6): "We say the Father alone, not because He is separate from the Son, or from the Holy
Ghost, but because they are not the Father together with Him." This, however, is not the usual way
of speaking, unless we understand another implication, as though we said "He who alone is called
the Father is God." But in the strict sense the exclusion affects the predicate. And thus the
proposition is false if it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it in the
neuter sense; because the Son is another person than the Father, but not another thing; and the
same applies to the Holy Ghost. But because this diction "alone," properly speaking, refers to the
subject, it tends to exclude another Person rather than other things. Hence such a way of speaking
is not to be taken too literally, but it should be piously expounded, whenever we find it in an
authentic work.
Reply to Objection 1. When we say, "Thee the only true God," we do not understand it as referring
to the person of the Father, but to the whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if
understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not excluded by reason of the unity of
essence; in so far as the word "only" excludes another thing, as above explained.
The same Reply can be given to Objection 2. For an essential term applied to the Father does not
exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, by reason of the unity of essence. Hence we must understand
that in the text quoted the term "no one" [Nemo = non-homo, i.e. no man] is not the same as "no
man," which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person of the Father could not be
excepted), but is taken according to the usual way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any
rational nature.
Reply to Objection 3. The exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the
term to which it is adjoined, if they do not differ in "suppositum," as part and universal. But the Son
differs in "suppositum" from the Father; and so there is no parity.
Reply to Objection 4. We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is Most High; but that He alone
is Most High "with the Holy Ghost, in the glory of God the Father."